McIntyre et al. v. R. – TCC: Issue estoppel does not apply to tax determinations arising out of plea bargains

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/70988/index.do New Window

McIntyre et al. v. The Queen
(April 9, 2014 – 2014 TCC 111) was an application under Rule 58 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure). The application stemmed from prior criminal proceedings in which two of the three applicants entered guilty pleas based on agreed facts (the “Agreed Facts):

[3] 900214 Alberta Ltd. (the “Corporation”) conducts business as an oilfield contractor and consultant. Sidney Grant McIntyre (“Grant”) and Lorraine McIntyre (“Lorraine”) are the directors of the Corporation and each are 50 percent shareholders. Grant works for the Corporation as an oilfield contractor and consultant. Lorraine is the Corporation’s bookkeeper.

[4] On June 16, 2009, the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) issued reassessments (the “First Reassessments”) in respect of the Appellants to which they filed Notices of Objection. Prior to this, the Appellants had been selected for audit and, subsequently, the Minister commenced a criminal investigation. This resulted in criminal proceedings against the Appellants for tax evasion pursuant to the Income Tax Act (“the ITA”) in respect of the 2002 to 2007 taxation years. Lorraine and the Corporation agreed to a disposition of the criminal proceedings by entering guilty pleas based upon the Agreed Facts. On March 25, 2011, Lorraine and the Corporation applied to change their pleas to guilty. The Court accepted the Agreed Facts and imposed sentences accordingly. The Information respecting Grant was withdrawn and he was never convicted.

The specific relief sought under Rule 58 essentially aimed to limit the Crown to taxation of amounts set out in the Agreed Facts (the reassessments under appeal exceeded those amounts):

[8] The Appellants posed the following questions for determination:

a. Do the principles of issue estoppel, res judicata, and abuse of process apply to prevent the Minister from assuming facts inconsistent with the Agreed Facts?

b. Are the Respondent and Appellants bound by the Agreed Facts for the purposes of these Tax Court of Canada appeals, in particular, but not limited to:

i) The Calculation of Lorraine’s capital gain associated with the disposition of the Mabel Lake Lot, referred to in paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Agreed Facts;

ii) Whether $61,995.91 received by 900Co from Progress Energy Ltd. and advanced to Grant and Lorraine constitute a shareholder debt under subsection 15(2) of the Income Tax Act, as referred to in paragraphs 13 to 19 of the Agreed Facts;

(iii) Whether 900Co’s net income (loss) for tax purposes is conclusively determined by virtue of paragraph 32 of the Agreed Facts; and,

iv) Whether Grant and Lorraine’s shareholder benefits assessed under subsection 15(1) of the Income Tax Act is conclusively determined by virtue of paragraphs 33 to 36 of the Agreed Facts.

(Appellants’ Notice of Motion, p. 7)

In the end the court dismissed that application for a number of reasons including the fact that only a portion of the proceedings in the Tax Court were covered by the Agreed Facts as well as the fact that the convictions were based on guilty pleas, not fact finding by a criminal court:

[44] In summary, issue estoppel may be applied to prevent a party from relitigating an issue when that same issue has been determined in prior proceedings in another court. The Agreed Facts address only the tax appeals of the Corporation and Lorraine. Since the Agreed Facts do not involve Grant’s income tax matters or the corporate GST appeal, there is no relitigation of these two matters and, as a consequence, the preconditions for issue estoppel are not met. Although the corporate ITA appeal and Lorraine’s appeal satisfy the mutuality of parties, the remaining two preconditions for issue estoppel are not met because there were issues in their tax appeals that were not dealt with in the prior criminal proceedings and plea bargain. Thus, there can be no finality of issues as required in issue estoppel. In addition, amounts dealt with in criminal proceedings are minimum amounts with respect to the civil proceedings. Therefore, the Minister is able to reassess amounts for income tax purposes in excess of the quantum of tax evaded and in respect of issues not determined in the criminal proceedings. It is clearly not a proper question to have it proceed to a Rule 58 determination under Stage Two where the Minister would be restricted in four tax appeals to a set of negotiated facts which resulted from a criminal plea bargain. This is particularly true where two of those four appeals are not addressed in the Agreed Facts. Caselaw has clearly established that issue estoppel does not apply in circumstances where the prior criminal conviction arises from a plea bargain. Such agreed facts arising from a plea bargain cannot be determinative of the facts in subsequent tax appeals. The distinction, between criminal convictions arising from evidentiary findings resulting from a hearing and those convictions arising from plea bargains, is an important one. The latter do not constitute issue estoppel. As acknowledged by Justice Bowie in Hagon, the reality of convictions based on plea bargains is that they do not arise as the result of a trial on the merits with judicial consideration and weighing of evidence and consequent findings of fact. Instead, they are based on the parties’ negotiations for the purposes of a plea bargain and sentencing. In these circumstances, there can be no relitigation because there was no litigation of the initial criminal charges in the first instance and the basis of the plea bargain may contain considerations beyond the merits of the case.

[45] For these reasons, this is not a proper question for a Stage Two inquiry pursuant to Rule 58. The matter is best left to the trial Judge, including the Appellants’ request to introduce some of the materials from the criminal proceedings. Even if I had permitted the question to go to Stage Two, I would be hesitant to grant leave to introduce that evidence for the purpose of this motion. It would have all the trappings of splitting the appeals and the motion would have the semblance of a trial. Caselaw has established that a Rule 58 motion is not a substitute for a trial nor should it be regarded as an easily accessible alternative to a trial.

[46] Finally, I conclude that to restrict the Minister in the civil tax appeals before this Court to the Agreed Facts, established pursuant to a plea bargain, would constitute an abuse of process. Otherwise, unfairness would result because the parties would effectively be prohibited from tendering evidence in the appeals before this Court when no evidence was tendered or weighed in the prior criminal proceedings and no judicial findings of fact were made. My reasoning is applicable to all four appeals but particularly to the corporate GST appeal and Grant’s ITA appeal, which were never addressed at all in the prior proceedings. The negotiated Agreed Facts are not determinative of the issues in the appeals that are before this Court and to conclude otherwise would negatively affect the preservation of the integrity and particularly the effectiveness of the Court. Fairness dictates that the administration of justice would be best served by dismissing this motion for a determination of a question pursuant to Rule 58 rather than permitting a Stage Two proceeding to proceed under this Rule.